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Abstract In this article we will demonstrate how cogni-
tive psychological research on reasoning and decision
making could enhance discussions and theories of moral
judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-
process models of moral judgments and describe selected
studies which support these approaches. However, we will
also present data that contradict the model predictions,
suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be
more complex. In the second part, we will show how
cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be
helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we
will highlight approaches addressing the interaction
between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a
sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to
be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based
on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict
detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral
decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g.,
harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The
response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes,
such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations
of harm caused.
Keywords Moral judgments  Dual-process theory 
Signal Detection Theory  Reasoning  Default
interventionist model  Intuitive logic
Dual-process approach to moral judgments
Fyodor Dostoyevsky in his Brothers Karamazov describes
a discussion, in which Ivan asks his brother Alyosha:
Tell me – I challenge you: let’s assume that you were
called upon to build the edifice of human destiny so
that men would finally be happy and would find
peace and tranquility. If you knew that in order to
attain this you would have to torture just one single
creature, let’s say the little girl who beat her chest so
desperately in the outhouse, and that on her una-
venged tears you could build that edifice, would you
agree to do it? Tell me and don’t lie.
No, I would not, Alyosha said softly.
Alyosha’s decision can be described as deontological; a
moral rule has to be obeyed no matter the consequences. It
follows that one cannot harm a single person even if the
whole of humanity would benefit from it. The opposite
moral position to deontology is utilitarianism, whereby
actions that maximize the general happiness are rated as
morally acceptable. Researchers in many fields, including
cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, try to find
mechanisms underlying each moral position, answering the
question: What makes some people utilitarian sometimes
and what deontological? They also inquire as to whether
people are consequentialist in their judgments, or vary
along this dimension depending on circumstances. To
investigate this, researchers usually employ a set of moral
dilemmas, such as the trolley dilemma (Foot 1978). In this
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dilemma one has to decide whether one would pull a lever
and change the track of an out-of-control trolley, which
would save five men but at the cost of one person who
stands on the other track. The majority of people decide to
pull the lever (Lanteri et al. 2008; Shallow et al. 2011). A
modification of this dilemma requires one to push a very
heavy man off a footbridge to stop the trolley (Quinn 1989;
Thomson 1985) and results in much lower number of
utilitarian decisions (Greene et al. 2001, 2004; Petrinovich
et al. 1993). This example shows that the majority of
people solve each moral problem separately rather than
having a strictly defined—deontological or utilitarian—
moral position they apply to all dilemmas. This finding
encouraged researchers to investigate what constitutes
specific moral judgments.
Researchers have proposed the theory that the two
components on which decisions are based are intuition
(Type 1 processing) and reflection (Type 2 processing).
Type 1 processing is fast, automatic, and heuristic, while
Type 2 processing is slow, rule-based, and typically
requires cognitive resources (e.g., working memory
capacity). Both types of cognitive processing can work
separately or at the same time but not necessarily at the
same speed, and when working simultaneously they may
cooperate or be in conflict (Evans and Stanovich 2013;
Stanovich 2009). Contemporary discussion is also strongly
affected by the work of Jonathan Haidt (Greene and Haidt
2002; Haidt 2001, 2007), suggesting a prominent role for
intuition in moral judgments. Haidt suggested that the vast
majority of moral judgments are processed intuitively, and
reflection mostly serves its role as a post hoc justification.
It was further proposed that the moral intuition was
deontological. In particular, when an individual engages in
controlled deliberation, they usually decide counter to their
immediate intuitions and might therefore reach a utilitarian
decision (Greene et al. 2004; Paxton et al. 2012).
There is evidence that supports the approach of the
reflexive basis for utilitarianism and intuitive character of
deontology. For example, it has been reported that people
endorse more deontological judgments under time pressure
(Suter and Hertwig 2011) and under cognitive load (Bialek
and De Neys 2016a; Trémolière and Bonnefon 2014).
Furthermore, Conway and Gawronski (2013) proposed that
deontological and utilitarian decisions are separate pro-
cesses, and showed that cognitive load selectively decrea-
ses utilitarian decisions. Additionally, it was found that
utilitarian decisions are associated with activity in dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex, which is also suggested to be
associated with higher-order cognitive processes. Further-
more, the tendency to engage in reflection increases the
likelihood of utilitarian decisions (Bartels 2008; Paxton
et al. 2012). In another study Greene et al. (2008) addi-
tionally showed that cognitive load increased the time
required to make a utilitarian decision without affecting the
time to make deontological decisions. Despite seemingly
strong evidence supporting dual-process theories of moral
judgments, in the following we will present challenges to
this theory.
Critique of dual-process theories of moral
judgments
Imagine a different moral dilemma: Would you, as a
doctor, kill one patient and then harvest his organs to use
them to cure five other dying patients? Even though this
should be rated as morally acceptable from a utilitarian
perspective, almost no one rates such an action as morally
acceptable. In the pilot to one of our studies (Bialek and De
Neys 2016b) we presented individuals with a set of four
moral dilemmas, including the doctor scenario. Out of
almost 200 participants, only one decided that he would do
the action. At the same time however, more than 60 % of
the tested individuals declared willingness to pull the lever
in the trolley dilemma or to redirect killing fumes to a room
with only one patient instead of three. What is (cognitively)
required to kill a patient, push the fat man down the tracks,
or pull the lever, in order to save five people? Indeed, the
‘‘net gain’’ of lives saved is always the same in those
dilemmas, and thus, the willingness to act should be the
same. Therefore, we doubt that the reported observation
can be explained by a utilitarian preference for greater
good. This allows us to ask two questions: Is the unwill-
ingness to sacrifice motivated by (1) deontological morality
or (2) by repulsive emotions causing an alarm reaction to
the prospect of directly harming a single victim? The main
difference between the two motives is that despite the same
outcome (no action taken), in the first case a decision is
consistent with one’s internal deontological moral beliefs,
while in the second case one ‘‘could’’ endorse the utili-
tarian morality, but emotions effectively block the appli-
cation of these preferences. Hence, some individuals who
are declaratively utilitarian can take utilitarian actions only
in some dilemmas (i.e., trolley dilemmas), but not in other,
more direct dilemmas (i.e., the doctor dilemma).
Several researchers (Bartels and Pizarro 2011; Kahane
et al. 2015) have examined the relationship between moral
dilemmas and personality traits. They reported a negative
correlation between utilitarian disposition and empathy and
a positive correlation between utilitarian disposition and
psychopathy. The authors suggested that within the
dilemmas, harm aversion is more significant than merely
applying utilitarian principles. When the harm caused is
indirect or a side effect of an action the chances of making
utilitarian judgment increase (Christensen and Gomila
2012). It can thus further be suggested that individuals
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whose emotional response is blocked or weakened are
more willing to sacrifice one person to save more. For
example, individuals in trait alexithymia are more often
accepting of the sacrifice (Patil and Silani 2014b) or accept
accidental harm caused by action (Patil and Silani 2014a).
Furthermore, research has also shown that individuals
under the influence of alcohol, whose emotional response
to causing harm is lowered, tend to be more utilitarian
(Duke and Bègue 2015).
In the light of Greene’s model (Greene 2014), one should
expect that lowered emotional response decreases the Type
1–Type 2 conflict in favor of the latter and thus results in
more utilitarian judgments. However, contrary to these
findings, our previously reported research showed that
pharmacologically blocked affective responses decreased
the willingness to sacrifice one person (Terbeck et al. 2013).
This opposes the idea that deontological judgments are cued
uniquely or predominantly by emotions. Furthermore, even
though Paxton et al. (2012) found that cognitive reflection
test scores positively correlated with utilitarian decisions,
according to Baron et al. (2015) this correlation is obtained
only because CRT correlates with actively open-minded
thinking. Thus, Baron argues that ‘‘utilitarian judgments
arise from a commitment to a utilitarian approach, which
exists before subjects come into the experiment.’’ There-
fore, it is suggested that the relationship between cognitive
reflection and utilitarian moral inclination might be more
complex. For example, Körner and Volk (2014) reported
that decreased cognitive capacity is associated with an
increased likelihood of making deontological judgments.
However, this effect was only found for the concrete con-
strual compared to the abstract, in which this relationship
was reversed. The above discussion on moral judgments
demonstrates the complexity of the topic, suggesting that
further research is required to answer the open questions of
cognitive mechanisms involved in moral dilemmas. We find
that the majority of theories on moral judgments utilize the
dual-process framework without explicitly indicating whe-
ther Type 1 and Type 2 processes are working sequentially
or in parallel; hence it is not explicitly stated whether Type
2 processes start together with Type 1 processes (i.e., run-
ning in parallel), or might, for example, be triggered by
some features of the Type 1 processes (i.e., sequential).
What is mostly agreed, however, is that Type 1 processes
are faster than the Type 2 processes (Kahneman 2011). In
the next section we will show how cognitive psychology
could enhance the discussion, by discussing intuitive and
deliberative processing, logical reasoning, and probabilistic
thinking. We have presented some of our arguments in a
previous more philosophical article (Bialek et al. 2014), but
this work extends the position and discusses the findings in
a broader context.
Cognitive psychology of reasoning
Cognitive psychology studies on decision making also
combine reflection and intuition. The most prominent
example of this type of problem is the belief bias (Evans
et al. 1983). Consider the following example,
All famous musicians are creative.
All people who take drugs are creative.
Therefore, all famous musicians take drugs.
This conclusion is logically invalid, but believable.
Typically, in reasoning studies, individuals are presented
with a set of premises and a conclusion and then are asked
to evaluate the validity of the conclusion. Research has
shown that the majority of people prefer believable con-
clusions over valid ones (Newstead et al. 1992). Moreover,
individuals usually only reason when the conclusion is
unbelievable (i.e., they do not engage in reflection when
the conclusion is believable). The conditional willingness
to reason is called motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) and
results in increased accuracy when assessing the validity of
unbelievable conclusions (Evans et al. 1983; Trippas et al.
2014). The interaction between believability and validity
delivers an example for the intuition-deliberation trade-off.
Here, researchers focused on conditions under which
individuals engage in effortful deliberation to override their
intuitive, belief-based response in reasoning tasks. The aim
is to understand how people detect that they should engage
in deliberation (De Neys and Bonnefon 2013). The simi-
larity of this problem with moral judgments is straight-
forward, and in the next part of the paper we will show
how, after introducing the analogy between believabil-
ity/morality and validity/utility, the study of reasoning can
influence the discussion on moral judgments.
There are two classical explanations of the belief bias:
misinterpreted necessity and selective scrutiny (Evans
2007, 2008). Without going into detail about these theories,
both focus on the believability of the conclusion as a factor
to trigger the deliberative reasoning process. When a
conclusion is believable people tend to accept the conclu-
sion without further analysis of its validity; but when the
conclusion is unbelievable they tend to search for coun-
terexamples (Johnson-Laird 2012) or analyze the logical
structure in order to reject the conclusion (Evans 2007;
Klauer et al. 2000). Alternatively, Type 2 processes are
triggered by ‘‘conflict detection’’ associated with intuitive
response (Pennycook et al. 2015). Similar to this, in moral
judgments for example, Haidt (2007) discussed the idea
that deliberation is only encouraged if the intuitive
response is unsatisfying (analogous to unbelievable),
specifically by creating too extreme negative emotional
response. However, if the intuitive response is satisfying
Cogn Process (2016) 17:329–335 331
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(analogous to believable) people tend to accept it or look
for justifications to increase their own confidence (Haidt
2001). This view on reasoning has been recently chal-
lenged by two types of research: Signal Detection Theory
and Logical Intuition. We will present these in more details
in the next section.
Signal Detection Theory and response biases
The interaction between beliefs and logic is important in
order for understanding moral judgments, as we need to
understand under which conditions deliberation is used to
justify (presumably a deontological) intuition and when to
reflect on the dilemma in order to override the intuition and
draw a (utilitarian) judgment. Sequential models of rea-
soning underline believability as a factor which is trig-
gering the reflection. Recently Dube et al. (2010) using
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) suggested otherwise; in the
SDT model of reasoning people are comparing distribu-
tions of arguments supporting different conclusions using a
response criterion (see Fig. 1). The criterion determines the
preference for Type 1 (rejecting a valid conclusion) or for
Type 2 (accepting invalid conclusion) errors.
According to Dube et al. (2010), people use a simple
heuristic of endorsing believable and rejecting unbelievable
conclusions (response bias). However, application of this
heuristic does not affect the accuracy of reasoning in any
way. While the accuracy of reasoning remains constant, the
type of error however changes after the application of dif-
ferent response criteria. This suggests that the previously
reported beliefs-by-validity interaction is an artifact asso-
ciated with the use of particular research methods and
analysis. This perspective on reasoning resulted in pro-
tracted discussions in the field (Klauer and Kellen 2011;
Singmann and Kellen 2014), and subsequent experiments
showed that response bias was affected by the complexity of
the task, cognitive abilities, and time pressure (Trippas et al.
2013). Summarizing this SDT approach, believability adds
nothing to the validity of assessment, but is merely
responsible for the general-affirmative or general-declining
approach. The SDT approach entails that reasoning indi-
viduals use a response criterion to simplify the decision
process by rejecting all unbelievable and accepting all
believable conclusions. Simultaneously, they can process
the validity of the conclusion and use its results to override
the heuristic response, e.g., endorsing the unbelievable, but
valid conclusion despite the general motivation to reject all
unbelievable conclusions. Overriding might occur mostly
for people with analytic cognitive style, as measured by the
CRT (Trippas et al. 2015).
Indeed, the idea that the evaluation of believability and
validity is independent and not interacting processes, can
inspire revision of the traditional models of moral
judgments. Compared to intuitive models of moral judg-
ments, which suggest that individuals engage in reasoning
to override the intuitive (presumably deontological)
response, the new approach to moral judgment could pre-
dict that an individual selects a decision criterion to decide
between two alternative actions. This criterion promotes a
general-affirmation or general-declining approach to moral
dilemmas and can be influenced, for example, by the
severity or directness of harm, and characteristics of the
people harmed or saved. Simultaneously, one can reflect on
moral rules and on consequences, using this reflection to
reconstruct the argument distribution and to override the
response bias. Hence, one can chose the utilitarian response
despite the motivation (induced by a conservative response
criterion) to reject any directly harmful actions. By anal-
ogy, one can also choose the deontological response
despite being motivated (induced by a liberal response
criterion) to promote actions associated with utilitarian
gain. Some initial research supports such a hypothesis. For
example, it has been shown that increased severity of harm
decreased the likelihood of making a utilitarian decision
(Trémolière and De Neys 2013).
This recent approach to reasoning could thus be incor-
porated into theoretical models of moral judgments by
reversing the roles of intuition and deliberation. Specifi-
cally, when reasoning one assesses the validity of a con-
clusion and the response criterion is affected by
believability of a conclusion. By analogy, we propose that
when solving a moral dilemma, one compares the utility of
both alternative actions using the response criterion, and
the criterion is affected by the affective response to the
harm caused. The affective response is presumably rather a
strong, ‘‘alarm-bell’’ reaction to causing harm (Greene
et al. 2001). We cannot refute the idea that more subtle
emotions which subsequently help to find more preferred
alternative can also affect the response criterion. However,
our main idea is that the criterion is predominantly affected
by strong, vivid emotions.
Considering the above, we propose that the response
criterion would affect moral judgments by promoting a
general attitude toward acting or non-acting, but would not
interact with the utility analysis. The presented SDT model
of reasoning does not explain the characteristics of the
validity (or utility), e.g., if is it a Type 1 or a Type 2
process. This issue can be discussed by the Logical Intu-
ition theory, which we present in the following section.
Conflict detection and intuitive estimation
of consequences
In reasoning, believability and validity are sometimes in
conflict. Both are claimed to have distinct cognitive
mechanisms: Believability is assessed intuitively and
332 Cogn Process (2016) 17:329–335
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validity reflectively (Evans et al. 1983; Newstead et al.
1992). The reflective source of the validity assessment has
recently been questioned by several researchers. For a
typical belief bias task (in which beliefs and validity are in
conflict), a non-conflict version of the task (in which beliefs
and validity cue the same response) is used as a bench-
mark. Simply put, despite neglecting validity in reasoning,
individuals are less confident when validity conflicts with
intuitive believability. De Neys and his colleagues (De
Neys 2014; De Neys et al. 2010) have shown that indi-
viduals detect that they give biased responses (i.e., are
endorsing believable but invalid conclusion), by declaring
lower confidence and requiring more time to analyze the
invalid conflict problem compared to an invalid no-conflict
syllogism. This conflict detection is also observed when
cognitive resources are limited by secondary task or when
deciding with increased working memory load (De Neys
and Schaeken 2007). Similar findings have been reported
by Pennycook et al. (2015), in a study on the base rate
neglect, where judgments of individuals are affected by
social stereotypes when assessing probabilities (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). Pennycook and his colleagues
(2014) have shown that despite people giving biased
responses, individuals detect the conflict between stereo-
type and prior probabilities.
Logical Intuition, despite being available under limited
cognitive resources, is claimed to have lower salience than
belief-based intuition. Hence, individuals feel something is
wrong with their intuitive response, but usually fail at
making this doubt explicit and fail to override the intuitive
response. Reflection, however, can increase the salience of
the Logical Intuition and therefore enhance more logical
reasoning (De Neys 2014; Handley and Trippas 2015).
Thus, we suggest that processes which are typically
claimed to be reflective (i.e., validity and probability
assessment) are now suggested to be intuitive. Compared to
the model of intuitive assessment of validity, an individual
is expected to be able to assess (at least broadly) the con-
sequences of considered moral alternatives (Dubljevic
and Racine 2014). Our recent research suggests that
deontological decision makers are also sensitive to conse-
quences (Bialek and De Neys 2016b), including under
cognitive load (Bialek and De Neys 2016a). Hence, indi-
viduals were as likely to intuitively represent consequences
as to consider validity or probability assessments. Because
consequences can be broadly estimated using Type 1 pro-
cesses, it would thus not be required to deliberate in order
to compare the utilities of alternatives, suggesting that
utilitarian judgments could also have their origins in
intuition.
Response bias and moral judgments
The theories proposed by Haidt (2007) and Greene and
Haidt (2002) suggest that deliberation can sometimes be
implemented to solve a specific dilemma, which is con-
sistent with the selective scrutiny model of belief bias in
which individuals only reason when a conclusion is
unbelievable. According to these theories, reflection pro-
motes utilitarian judgments. However, as we have dis-
cussed, negative emotions associated with directly causing
harm can induce individuals to adapt their response crite-
rion along a conservative dimension, so it produces fewer
false alarms, and subsequently cause individuals to demand
greater utilitarian gain in order to make a utilitarian deci-
sion. Keeping the utilitarian gains constant across different
dilemmas, while changing the required moral action, might
increase the level of emotional response that is required for
the sacrifices in particular dilemmas and increase the
internal conflict and lower the metacognitive ‘‘feeling of
rightness.’’ Low confidence might thus subsequently trig-
ger reflection, which can either lead to trying to justify the
intuitive response or to reconstruct the arguments so to find
a more satisfying conclusion. In sum, we suggest that
individuals engage in deliberation usually when the intu-
itive response does not provide enough confidence (‘‘feel-
ing of rightness’’), regardless of whether this response is
utilitarian or deontological. Most judgments however are
made on the intuitive level, by broad argument represen-
tation, and its comparison using the response criterion.
Fig. 1 Signal Detection Theory
model of reasoning. Criterion is
adjusted according to one’s
subjective preferences and is
affected by believability of a
conclusion. The sensitivity
index d0 is a measure of
similarity of the argument
distributions
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There is still the remaining question regarding which
response to rely on when the response criterion would be
general affirmative or general declining. We created three
model predictions which are different to those following
from Greene’s model: (1) dilemma cued response, (2)
moral inclinations cued response, and (3) promotion of the
omission bias. Specifically, Greene’s model of moral
judgments would suggest that the general-declining
response criterion would promote deontological judgments,
as these are assumed to be intuitive.
The first prediction is derived from the work of Kahane
(Kahane 2012; Kahane et al. 2012), who described a
problem, in which two of your friends are married, and you
know that one of them had an affair. You believe that this
will never happen again. The other member of the couple is
suspicious and asks you whether you know anything about
the unfaithful partner. Should you tell the truth, knowing it
can destroy their marriage? In this dilemma it is suggested
by Kahane that the utilitarian response is intuitive—re-
gardless of what they ultimately choose, people intuitively
focus on saving the marriage (utilitarian consideration)
rather than on their duty to tell the truth (deontological
consideration). Considering this example, we conclude that
the response criterion would promote the decision which is
cued by the particular dilemma.
The second prediction is derived from the work of
Baron, who, after re-examining data from several studies
on moral judgments, suggested that the first considered
alternative depends from the person’s core moral prefer-
ence (Baron et al. 2012). Supporting this claim he showed
that the decisions that take the longest time in dilemmas are
the ones suggested to be most difficult (the probability of
deontological and utilitarian responding is about 50/50).
Therefore, one can assume that more effort is required to
override moral inclinations associated with a particular
dilemma rather than overriding deontological intuitions
with (utilitarian) reflection.
The third prediction is that general-declining response
biases promote the omission bias (Spranca et al. 1991)
presumably because individuals perceive omissions as non-
decisions (Kordes-de Vaal 1996). This would result in
greater preference for the default outcome, which in the
majority of moral dilemmas is the deontological option.
In conclusion, recent findings suggest a need for a
focused study on conflict detection in moral dilemmas. Our
proposed approach to moral judgment is different to any
dual-process model of moral judgment, whether sequential
or parallel. We suggest that the judgment is based on
competing intuitions according to a response criterion.
Reflection can interfere and override the intuitive response,
but does not necessarily lead to utilitarian judgments.
Extending this topic, we have recently analyzed the impact
of forced deliberation on moral judgments, showing that
some type of reflection leads to deontological judgments
and eliminates the impact of the type of harm caused (di-
rect or indirect), while numerical reflection leads to utili-
tarian judgments and does not eliminate the impact of the
type of harm (Bialek et al. 2016). This finding is contrary to
the dual-process concept of moral judgments, but consis-
tent with a SDT model of reasoning. Indeed, we suggest
that the response bias can be a mechanism responsible for
moral decision making and internal conflict resolution.
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